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Abstract
Purpose – There appears to be no empirical-based method in the literature for estimating if an engineering
change proposal (ECP) will occur or the dollar amount incurred. This paper aims to present an empirically
based approach to address this shortfall.
Design/methodology/approach – Using the cost assessment data enterprise database, 533 contracts
were randomly selected via a stratiﬁed sampling plan to build two regression models: one to predict the
likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP and the other to determine the expected median per cent increase
in baseline contract cost if an ECP was likely. Both models adopted a stepwise approach. A validation set was
placed aside prior to anymodel building.
Findings – Not every contract incurs an ECP; approximately 80 per cent of the contracts in the database did
not have an ECP. The likelihood of an ECP and the additional amount incurred appears to be statistically
independent of acquisition phase, branch of service, commodity, contract type or any other factor except for
the basic contract amount and the number of contract line item numbers; both of these later variables equally
affected the contract percentage increase because of an ECP. The combined model overall bested current
anecdotal approaches to ECPwithhold.
Originality/value – This paper both serves as a published reference point for ECP withholds in the
archival forum and presents an empirically based method for determining per cent ECPwithhold to use.
Keywords Regression modeling, Contract portfolio management, ECP withhold,
Engineering change proposal
Paper type Research paper
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Introduction and background
History suggests that, by and large, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military
departments have underestimated the cost of buying new weapon systems. Arena et al.
(2006) analyzed major DoD programs and discovered these experienced nearly 46 per
cent cost growth before the end of Milestone B and another 16 per cent growth by
Milestone C. As a recent example, this cost growth trend continued with the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program. As of the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the JSF
per-unit estimate has grown 57 per cent from its initial October 2001 estimated value.
To combat and possibly militate against cost growth, Congress enacted the Weapon
System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, often called WSARA as public law 111-23. The act
created a Pentagon ofﬁce – Ofﬁce of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) – to
analyze the cost of defense programs. One particular factor related to cost growth are
technical changes. These engineering change proposals (ECPs) can occur for many reasons.
An ECP necessitates a scope change to a contract. They can be initiated by the government,
the contractor or even feedback from the users.
The Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) found that 63 per cent of major defense
programs had requirement changes after system development began [Government
Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO), 2008]. Additionally, those programs with requirement
changes encountered, on average, cost growth of 72 per cent, while costs grew by only 11
per cent among those programs that did not change requirements. The fundamental
purpose of an ECP is to change the requirements of a contract [Engineering Change
Proposal (ECP), 2017]. To build in ﬂexibility, the acquisition practice is to estimate a
dollar value to hold in reserve after the contract is awarded. This amount has several
names, for the purpose of this article, we call it ECP withhold, as it is the amount of
money the Government withholds for ECPs.
There are three major cost estimating guides commonly used by Air Force cost analysts
today: the air force cost analysis handbook (AFCAH), the GAO cost estimating and
assessment guide and the USA Air Force – cost risk and uncertainty analysis handbook
(AFCRUH). Each provides overlapping material and views to best estimate cost and risk;
however, none of the guides provide an empirical-based method for estimating ECP
withhold. Given this lack of guidance, practitioners use common rules-of-thumb for ECP
withhold.
A relatively common one among the acquisition community is that estimates may
vary by 10 per cent. This is seen in several separate ﬁelds and disciplines. The starting
amount for estimating management reserve is 5-10 per cent (Project Management
Institute, 2017). The amount over cost for an acquisition program baseline breach is 10
per cent [Department of Defense (DoD), 2015]. Currently, the Air Force Life Cycle
Management Center allots the following percentages. For development cost estimates, a
10 per cent cost is added above the total estimate, while for procurement estimates, that
percentage lowers to 6 per cent (S. Valentine, personal communication, multiple dates,
2015-2017). Finally, the automated cost estimating integrated tools software package
uses a range between 6-10 per cent.
The purpose of this article is to present empirically based models via historical
data that can be used to not only estimate the likelihood of a contract experiencing an
ECP but also determine the amount of ECP withhold as a percentage of the total
contract cost. In addition, the study compares these models to three alternative rules-
of-thumb. The analysis presented in this paper is at the contract level and not a
program level.
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Database and methodology
CAPE’s mission is to provide independent program analyses and insights as
requested by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics and Congress. Additionally, CAPE reviews programs that may be, or
already are, struggling in the acquisition process. To facilitate their mission, CAPE
initiated the development of the cost assessment data enterprise (CADE), the
Department’s initiative to identify and integrate data from disparate databases and
systems for better decision-making, management of, and oversight of the
Department’s acquisition portfolio.
As of 11 April 2017, CADE hosted a contract level database consisting of 7,343 unique
contracts with details extracted from the electronic document access (EDA) system. EDA
is a Web-based system that provides for storage and retrieval of not only DoD contracts
but also contract modiﬁcations [Electronic Document Access (EDA), 2017]. This study
uses EDA data extracted from CADE as the primary data source. This database in turn
forms the basis from which to develop empirical regression models to predict not only the
likelihood of a contract having an ECP but also the additional per cent increase from the
ECP.
Both the large number of available contracts and the requisite time to manually check
contract details necessitated using a stratiﬁed sampling plan. The preliminary intent was to
randomly sample 10 per cent of the population; but from the time constraints, the resultant
percentage ended closer to 9 per cent (as documented in the next section). Initial
stratiﬁcation included four main criteria consisting of the following contract elements:
phase, schedule, size, and type. Phase is divided into development versus other (production/
operations and support). Schedule is divided into contracts that have an initial schedule
longer than one year or those equal to or less than a year. Size separates contracts that have
a baseline cost greater than $5m ($5,000,000) versus contracts that have a baseline cost less
than or equal to $5m. Contract type splits contracts by those with greater than 90 per cent
ﬁxed ﬁrm price (FFP). An additional stratum takes into consideration very large contracts,
speciﬁcally those exceeding $400m. This was because of the preliminary ﬁndings from
Cordell (2017). [Note: all dollar amounts are in Base Year (BY) 2016 dollars.] Table I displays
the initial strata.
This arrangement presents 16 possible strata from which to sample in addition to the
one accounting for very large ECP contracts. As shown in the Analysis and Results
section, these 17 total strata ultimately collapse to 7 for sample collection purposes from
the population. Sample percentages are statistically matched to that of the population
percentages to ensure these bins correspond accordingly and are checked via a paired
t-test. In addition, a second paired t-test is conducted to show that the sample matches
that of the population with respect to percentile distributions by type of contract, branch
of service, and commodity. These inferential tests are conducted at a signiﬁcance level of
0.05.
Once the stratiﬁcation plan is ﬁnalized, errant contracts are ﬁltered out prior to populating
the study’s database. These errors may include, for example, missing contract dates, missing
contract amounts or even a negative contract award since a contract cannot possess a
negative value. Other errors may also include modiﬁcations being incorrectly classiﬁed as a
cost modiﬁcation despite adding scope, which is an ECP by deﬁnition. In the next section, we
list the main errors detected in building the modeling database and the number affected by
each exclusion criteria. As mentioned previously, all dollar amounts are converted to BY
2016 dollars to account for the effects of inﬂation. Because of the unavailability of military
appropriation category for the contracts in the database and the length of some aircraft
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contracts, we used the total manufacturing producer price index as reported by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics for the conversions. All analysis in this article used JMP12 Pro, Excel or R.
The models presented in this article predict two response variables. The ﬁrst is a binary
(dichotomous) variable for the logistic regression model. If a contract has any technical
ECPs, the response is a 1. If the contract has no technical ECPs, the response is a 0. The
second is a continuous variable for the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. This variable is
the natural logarithm of the per cent cost growth strictly relating to changing requirements.
[Note: the highly skewed percentage growth, in addition to other skewed predictors
variables, necessitated a log-log modeling approach. This is mentioned and demonstrated
via a graph in the next section.] The per cent ECP growth is the sum of all modiﬁcations that
are listed as a change in requirements, divided by the contract’s baseline cost. The end result
of the OLSmodel is the predicted median per cent of ECP withhold.
With respect to identifying possible explanatory variables either associated with the
likelihood of an ECP occurring or the median per cent of ECP withhold, we turn to the
literature. Trudelle et al. (2017); Bolten et al. (2008) and Arena et al. (2006) document several
potential variables to be predictive factors for determining if a program will experience cost
growth. Additionally, Harmon and Arnold (2013) performed an assessment on contracts
types, attempting to understand the impact of overall contract price. They determined that
for a series of production contracts in which the system design is mature and stable, the best
choice of contract type is FFP. This ﬁnding played a key role in determining one of the
strata in the sampling plan. Table II lists the possible explanatory variables considered in
the analysis to predict the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP as well as the
expected median percentage increase. As noted in the next section, given the large number
of F/A-18E/F contracts in the population, a dichotomous predictor variable, labeled F18, has
been added to statistically test if that program overly inﬂuences the modeling database
either with the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP or the expected median
percentage increase.
Prior to any model building, the study’s database is randomly partitioned into two
components: the modeling data set and the validation data set. This is accomplished by
generating a random uniform number for each contract, sorting from smallest to largest
random number, and then pulling the requisite percentage as needed. For the logistic model,
because of the large sample size, approximately 50 per cent of the contracts are set aside for
Table I.
Initial population
stratum
characteristics
Population stratum
elements (name) Characteristic present
1 (DEV) Development contracts
2 (Non-DEV) Production or operations and support contracts
3 (Short) Initial contract duration equal to or less than a year
4 (Long) Initial contract duration longer than a year
5 (Small) Baseline contract cost equal to or less than $5,000,000
6 (Large) Baseline contract cost exceeds $5,000,000 but less than $400,000,000
7 (FFP) Total per cent of initial contract type and modiﬁcation contract types greater
than 90% FFP
8 (Non-FFP) Total per cent of initial contract type and modiﬁcation contract types is equal
to or less than 90% FFP
Special Baseline contract cost equals or exceeds $400,000,000
Notes: Strata pairs 1/2, 3/4, 5/6, and 7/8 are complementary events. All dollars presented in base year 2016
values. Baseline contract cost equals initial contract cost plus all priced options
Likelihood and
cost impact
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model validation. For the OLS model, approximately 20 per cent of the contracts that
experienced an ECP are set aside for validation since the sample is greatly reduced when
modeling just those contracts with an ECP. None of the contracts in the validation set were
used to create the respective statistical models.
Before validating the OLS model, the customary residual assumptions of normality
and constant variance are tested by using the Shapiro–Wilk test and the Breusch–Pagan
test, respectively. Both are conducted at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. Additionally,
multicollinearity, outliers and inﬂuential data points are investigated to prevent model
bias. Variance inﬂation factors (VIF) highlight the linear relationship between
independent variables and a VIF score higher than 5 suggests multicollinearity.
Regarding outliers, any studentized residual greater than three standard deviations is
categorized as an outlier and a possible source of concern. Finally, Cook’s Distance
detects overly inﬂuential data points possibly skewing the results. Any value greater
than 0.5 is investigated closely.
To assess validity of the developed logistic regression model, the confusion matrix is
used. This matrix assesses the number of true positives, true negatives, false positives and
false negatives, respectively. A cutoff criterion of 0.5 is set as the prediction threshold to
separate a contract into “ECP likely” vs “ECP not likely”. The validity of the OLS model is
assessed in multiple criteria: mean absolute per cent error (MAPE), median absolute per cent
error (MdAPE), coefﬁcient of determination (R2) and adjusted R2. Each absolute per cent
Table II.
Explanatory
variables considered
in the development of
the logistic
regression model to
predict the likelihood
of a contract having
an ECP and the
expected median
percentage increase
caused by the ECP
Variable name Description of subcategories
Phase Acquisition phase of the contract: operations and support, production, or
development
Service Branch in the Government that let the contract: Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
Army or Department of Defense (Joint)
Commodity type Majority of product on contract. For example, Aircraft, Missile, Ground Vehicle,
AIS (Automated Information System), Munitions, Ordnance, Electronics, etc. A
total of 17 types were considered
Contract type Funding outlay as deﬁned in Federal Acquisition Report (FAR) Part 16
Procurement. For example, Fixed-Price Contracts, Cost-Reimbursement Contracts,
or Incentive Contracts. A total of 9 types were considered
Mod category Assigned classiﬁcation of the contract modiﬁcation (technical, baseline, or schedule
for example). A total of 8 categories were considered
Baseline cost Cost in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 dollars of the initial contract plus priced options
Basic cost Cost in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 dollars of the initial contract
Schedule Length of the contract in terms of days
Contract Year Start/
End
Date the initial contract started or ended. Investigated years 2010, 2011, and 2012 to
determine if the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 or
Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives launched in 2010 had an effect on a contract
F18 This dichotomous variable assumes a value of ‘1’ if the contract is a part of the F/A-
18E/F program
Few CLINs This dichotomous variable assumes a value of ‘1’ if the number of CLINs equaled 5
or less. This number was chosen since it represented the 90th percentile of CLINs in
the database. Only 10 % of contracts have more than 5 CLINs on their basic
contract
CLINs on Basic
Truncated at 5
This continuous variable assumes the value equal to the number of CLINs if the
number of CLINs equaled 5 or less, else it assumes the value of 5
CLINs on Basic This continuous variable assumes the value equal to the number of CLINs
regardless of the number
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error is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between a predicted response
minus the actual response divided by the actual response.
For both the OLS model and the logistic model, a mixed stepwise procedure is adopted to
arrive at the models presented in the next section. A level of signiﬁcance is set to 0.01 to
determine initial predictive ability of an explanatory variable. From there, the preliminary
selected variables are investigated to determine their practical effect on the respective
model. If a particular explanatory variable is determined to have less than a 1 per cent
relative effect on a particular model’s response, then that variable is excluded from being in
the ﬁnal model that is presented for practitioners’ use. This is done to minimize a variable
being statistically signiﬁcant but having little practical effect.
To ﬁnalize the presented results, four different methods and their recommended ECP
withholds are compared descriptively. The ﬁrst method uses the application of the
presented regression models in this article. The second method involves having no ECP
withhold (essentially assuming no additional costs for a contract). The third adopts the
per cent found anecdotally in the literature: 6 per cent for development and 10 per cent for
procurement contracts. The last method simply uses a ﬂat average. This average is the
average per cent ECP growth for all contracts with no discrimination between life-cycle
phases and applied indiscriminately to all contracts.
Analysis and results
From an initial population of 7,343 contracts housed within the CADE database on 11, April
2017, 1,416 were excluded because of missing or erroneous data, resulting in an effective
population size of 5,927 or approximately 81 per cent of the total starting number. Table III
highlights the main reasons that attributed to approximately 84 per cent of the exclusions.
Of the 1,416 contracts removed prior to creating a stratiﬁed random sample for the study’s
analysis, missing contract type associated with a contractual amount was the dominant
exclusionary reason, accounting for approximately 43 per cent of the 1,416 contracts
removed for consideration. The next highest reason was missing an end date to a
modiﬁcation of an initial contract. That reason accounted for 313 contracts or approximately
22 per cent of the excluded contracts.
With respect to the bin characteristics as discussed in the previous section, Table IV
shows the population percentages, while Table V highlights the ﬁnal selected seven strata
percentages for both the population and sample, respectively. The paired t-test comparing
the percentages of the population strata to that of the sample strata results in a p-value of
0.96, which concludes in failing to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, at a 0.05 level of
signiﬁcance, the paired t-test strongly suggests that the modeling database appears
statistically equivalent to the population.
Regarding acquisition phase, branch of service and commodity type, Table VI lists the
percentages by both population and sample. Conducting another paired t-test comparing the
Table III.
Primary contract
exclusion reasons
Criteria No. (%)
No contract type associated with the dollar value given 603 43
Missing end date of a modiﬁcation to an initial contract 313 22
Missing end date to the initial contract 183 13
Total contract amount summed (initial plus any modiﬁcations) to a negative dollar value 79 6
Note: Percentages rounded to two decimal places
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percentages of the population strata to that of the sample strata results in a p-value of 0.99,
which again supports the preceding results that the modeling database appears statistically
equivalent to the population. One other noticeable conclusion from Table VI highlights a
high number of Navy or aircraft contracts in the population.
Delving further, a large per cent of the population contracts stem from the F/A-18E/F
(Super Hornet) program only. Approximately 42 per cent of all the contracts originated
from the F/A-18E/F with the second highest being approximately 4 per cent for the
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) program. However, in terms of total
cost (sum of all contracts for a given program), the F-22 (Raptor) leads all programs
and account for approximately 7.6 per cent of the total population contract cost, while
the F/A-18E/F accounts for approximately 5.9 per cent of the total amount. In total, the
Table IV.
Population
breakdown of the
5,927 contracts and
associated
percentages
Bin no. Contract phase Contract length Contract cost Contract type No. Population (%)
1 Non-DEV Short Small FFP 1,360 23
2 Non-DEV Short Small Non-FFP 1,147 19
3 Non-DEV Long Small FFP 966 16
4 Non-DEV Long Small Non-FFP 767 13
5 Non-DEV Long Large FFP 367 6
6 DEV Short Small Non-FFP 264 4
7 Non-DEV Long Large Non-FFP 227 4
8 Non-DEV Short Large FFP 174 3
9 DEV Long Large Non-FFP 153 2
10 Non-DEV Short Large Non-FFP 135 2
11 DEV Long Small Non-FFP 99 2
12 DEV Short Small FFP 82 1
13 DEV Long Small FFP 52 1
14 DEV Short Large Non-FFP 50 1
15 DEV Long Large FFP 25 0*
16 DEV Short Large FFP 7 0*
17 N/A N/A N/A N/A 52 1
Notes: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number; the 0%*denotes a percentage less than 1%
Table V.
Consolidated strata
for study sample
along with
population and
matching sample
characteristics
Stratum
no.
Bin Grouping
from Table III
Population
no.
Population %
(Out of 5,927)
Sample
no.
Sample %
(Out of 541)
Paired
percentile
difference
1 1 1,360 22.9 118 21.8 1.1
2 2 1,147 19.4 101 18.7 0.7
3 3 966 16.3 92 17.0 0.7
4 5,7,8, and 10 903 15.2 84 15.5 0.3
5 4 767 12.9 71 13.1 0.2
6 6,9,11-16 732 12.4 70 12.9 0.5
7 17 52 0.9 5 0.9 0
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth
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population database contains 132 unique programs, while the random sample contains
68 unique programs. Appendix lists all the programs considered in the sample
database.
Logistic model
Out of the 541 contracts in the sample database, 271 were randomly set aside for the
validation set. The remaining 270 were used as the modeling set for the logistic model.
Customarily, an 80/20 ratio is used; however, because of the relatively large size of the
sample database, a 50/50 split was preferable to allow for greater generalization testing. A
relatively equal number of ECPs were in each set, which was commensurate with the overall
ECP percentage of approximately 17 per cent.
Prior to commencing any analysis, a histogram reﬂecting the baseline cost for all 541
contracts highlighted 8 contracts (approximately 1.5 per cent of the sample database) that
noticeably appeared as outliers, whereas the remaining 533 contracts (which were equal to
or less than $164m in Fiscal Year 2016 dollars) had a relatively smooth lognormal
distribution (p-value of approximately 0.04 for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness of ﬁt
statistic, which is reasonable given the large sample size). The smallest baseline cost of these
eight outliers was $260m, while the largest was $2.6bn. Given the sparsity and 10-fold
difference between the lowest and largest baseline contract cost of these eight, we chose at
this point to remove from consideration these contracts, which in turns removes from
consideration the explanatory variable of contract size extra-large (programs exceeding
$400m) and limits the paper’s inferential results to contracts $160m or less.
With this change in mind, the model building set reduced to 265 and the validation set
lowered to 267. Table VII highlights two possible models for predicting the likelihood of a
contract experiencing an ECP as selected by stepwise regression. The explanatory variable
Ln (Baseline cost) [the natural logarithm of a contract’s baseline cost] and the explanatory
Table VI.
Population and
sample
characteristics by
acquisition phase,
service, and
commodity type
Variable Subcategory Population/Sample no. Population/Sample percentage
Acquisition phase Operations and Support 2,822/252 47.6/46.6
Production 2,364/218 39.9/40.3
Development 741/71 12.5/13.1
Service Navy 3,286/300 55.4/55.5
Air Force 1,375/133 23.2/24.6
Marine Corps 726/63 12.2/11.6
DoD 329/21 5.6/3.9
Army 211/24 3.6/4.4
Commodity type Aircraft 3,856/358 65.1/66.2
Missiles 565/62 9.5/11.5
Ground Vehicle 483/43 8.2/8.0
AIS 453/30 7.6/5.5
M&O 235/20 4.0/3.7
Electronics 221/17 3.7/3.1
Other 114/11 1.9/2.0
Notes: Commodity Other group consists of contracts for unmanned aerial vehicles, decoys, engines, guns,
lasers, non-lethal systems, radar, ships, space, or targets/drones, AIS stands for Automated Information
Systems contracts, while M&O stands for Munitions and Ordnance contracts. Percentages rounded to the
nearest tenths
Likelihood and
cost impact
29
variables contract size large and contract size small are complementary in nature given both
small and large contracts are included in the entire gambit of baseline contract costs.
Therefore, stepwise only ﬂagged one model at a time as being signiﬁcant, but we chose both
going forward into validation to determine which of the two might be ultimately better in
predicting the likelihood of an ECP. No other explanatory variable proved statistically
signiﬁcant given the cost of the contract was already in the model, including the F18
variable. The overall takeaway is that the cost of the contract appears to be the
overwhelmingly dominant factor in determining the likelihood of an ECP.
With respect to how well both models predict a contract experiencing an ECP, Table VIII
displays the confusion matrix for the model building and validation datasets. Overall, both
models reﬂect a high predictive ability for detecting contracts that do not experience an
ECP; however, both reﬂect quite poorly at predicting ECPs, with Model 1 displaying some
ability to predict the true likelihood of an ECP. Model 2 (as evident from Table VII) reﬂects
that a breakpoint potentially occurs somewhere in the lower cost spectrum for contracts
equal to or less than $100,000 have a lower chance of incurring an ECP compared to
contracts greater than $5m. In fact, of the 533 contracts in the sample database whose
baseline cost is less than or equal to $100,000 (171 in total), only one contract had an ECP.
We use this information later in terms of overall model application.
OLS model
The linear (OLS) model is designed to predict the amount of cost growth solely attributable
to ECPs. This response is in the form of the natural logarithm of the percentile increase. To
revert to the actual expected percentage, one would take the natural exponent of the
predicted value, which results in the expected median percentile increase due to incurring an
ECP. As mentioned in the previous section, contracts that had a net negative ECP growth
Table VIII.
Confusion matrices
for the two logistic
regression candidate
models for predicting
the likelihood of a
contract experiencing
an ECP
Model no. True positives True negatives False positives False negatives
1 Model 13 (28%) 208 (95%) 10 (5%) 34 (72%)
1 Test 13 (28%) 199 (90%) 23 (10%) 33 (72%)
2 Model 0 (0%) 218 (100%) 0 (0%) 47 (100%)
2 Test 0 (0%) 222 (100%) 0 (0%) 46 (100%)
Notes: Parenthetical percentages reﬂect the accuracy rate of the chosen metric. Information is reﬂective of
both the modeling dataset (Model; 265 contracts) and validation set (Test; 268 contracts). Percentages
rounded to two decimal places
Table VII.
Candidate models for
predicting the
likelihood of a
contract experiencing
an ECP
Model no. Variable Estimate p-value
1 Intercept 8.41 <0.0001
Ln (Baseline cost): natural logarithm of the contract baseline cost 0.50 <0.0001
2 Intercept 1.52 <0.0001
Contract size large 1.44 0.0001
Contract size small 2.96 0.0041
Note:All values rounded to two signiﬁcant digits
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are not considered. This occurs whenever a contract de-scopes effort and cannot be used to
obtain an accurate ECPwithhold before contract award.
Of the 541 contracts in the original sample database, 99 experienced a contract increase
because of an ECP. Of these 99, 20 were initially randomly set aside for the validation set,
while the remaining 79 were used to develop the OLS model. After accounting for the eight
contracts excluded because of a very large baseline contract cost (exceeding $164m), these
numbers changed to 71 for the modeling dataset with 20 remaining in the validation set,
respectively.
Given the highly skewed pattern of ECP percentage increase, basic contract cost,
baseline contract cost and the schedule (in days) of the contract, all of these variables were
transformed via the natural logarithm function. As an example of this, Figure 1 displays the
typical skewed right pattern of the basic contract cost in addition to its distribution after the
transformation.
Figure 1.
Upper graph displays
typical presentation
of either basic
contract cost, baseline
contract cost, ECP
percentage increase
or contract length
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Table IX highlights the preliminary model for predicting the expected natural log
percentage increase in contract cost because of an ECP. The model has an R2 of 0.37 and an
adjusted R2 of 0.35, respectively. No other explanatory variable proved statistically
signiﬁcant after accounting for the cost of the basic contract along with the number of
CLINs truncated at ﬁve (that is ﬁve or more CLINs are grouped into the ﬁve CLIN group). In
no iteration did the F18 variable prove statistically signiﬁcant, similar to the ﬁndings of the
logistic model. The candidate model in Table IX passed all model diagnostics with no issues
with multicollinearity (largest VIF score of 1.13), outliers (largest studentized residual value
of 2.5), inﬂuential datapoints (largest Cook’s D value of 0.13), normality (Shapiro–Wilk test
p-value of 0.47) or constant variance (Breusch–Pagan test p-value of 0.50).
For the OLS model, for both the modeling and validation datasets, the MAPE and
MdAPE are 86 per cent and 35 per cent and 130 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively. The
higher MAPEs in comparison to the lower MdAPEs reﬂects moderate outliers in both
datasets, while the relative comparable MdAPEs are a better measure of the model’s
consistency and generalization. Table X highlights the ﬁnal empirical model after updating
with the validation dataset and used in conjunction with the results of the previously
presented logistic models. Equation (1) represents the user model in mathematical form,
taking into consideration back-transformation. Note: a user would only use equation (1) for
any contract whose baseline cost exceeds $100,000 but is less than or equal to $164m (both
in BY $16). Otherwise, the expected median percentage would be zero given a very, very low
chance of lower cost contracts (equal to or less than $100,000) incurring an ECP:
Expected percentage contract cost ¼ e3:320:30Ln BasicCostð Þ0:33 CLINsonBasicTruncatedat5ð Þ
(1)
Table XI compares using equation (1) to three other ECP withhold methods. For all
methods, we use the entire sample database of 533 contracts for the comparisons. The
ﬁrst method assumes no ECP withhold, essentially assuming the contract never
Table X.
Final linear model for
predicting the
natural logarithm of
the expected
percentage contract
increase due to
experiencing an ECP
Variable Estimate t-ratio p-value
Intercept 3.32 2.93 0.0043
Ln (Basic Cost) 0.30 3.87 0.0002
CLINs on Basic Truncated at 5 0.33 3.76 0.0003
Note: Numbers truncated to two decimal places
Table IX.
Candidate linear
model for predicting
the natural logarithm
of the expected
percentage contract
increase due to
experiencing an ECP
Variable Estimate t-ratio p-value
Intercept 3.34 2.42 0.0184
Ln (Basic Cost) 0.30 3.13 0.0025
CLINs on Basic Truncated at 5 0.41 4.14 <0.0001
Note: Numbers truncated to two decimal places
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experiences an ECP. The second method, referenced in the literature, uses 6 per cent for
development and 10 per cent for procurement contracts. The last and third method uses a
simple ﬂat average applied indiscriminately regardless of phase. The average ECP
withhold of the 533 contracts in the sample database is approximately 5.9 per cent. This
is the value used for the ﬂat average method. Based on the average ranking of best (1) to
worst (4), equation (1) appears to be the best method of the four presented with an
average rank of 1.8. All methods used the true ﬁnal cost of a contract to determine the
percentages and amounts. Final cost equaled total baseline cost in addition to any ECP
amounts documented.
Discussion and conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, no peer-reviewed source could be found that documents the
amount of ECPwithhold that should be set aside for DoD contracts. Only anecdotal amounts
were present in the literature. The aim of this paper served dual purposes: one, as a
published reference point for ECP withholds in the archival forum; and two, derive an
empirically-based method for determining percent ECPwithhold.
Based on the analysis presented, several points became evident. One, not every contract
incurs an ECP; however, ECPs do occur and not budgeting accordingly results in a serious
shortfall as shown in Table XI. Two, both the likelihood of an ECP and the additional amount
incurred appears to be statistically independent of acquisition phase, branch of service,
commodity, contract type or any other factor except for the basic contract amount and the
number of contract line item numbers (CLINs). Both of these variables equally affected the
contract percentage increase due to an ECP. Finally, the logistic regression approach proved
a poor predictor of determining the likelihood of a DoD contract incurring an ECP. However,
it did provide invaluable insight that lower cost contracts appeared statistically less likely to
incur an ECP. Preliminary analysis suggests that this breakpoint might be around $100,000;
however, future research is encouraged to further delve into this lower boundary.
As with any research, limitations do exist for the results in this paper. Quality statistical
analysis depends on quality data. Therefore, any errors within CAPE’s database pulled from
EDA will pass down to the sample database that formed the conclusions stated in this
paper. Additionally, the encouraged use of equation (1) requires a portfolio managed
approach to contracts in an organization. That is, an agency or manager overseeing a
multitude of contracts is able to move ECP withhold amounts from contract to contract as
Table XI.
Comparison of the
method presented in
this paper [equation
(1)] to having no ECP
withhold, engaging
the apparent current
practice of 6 per cent
ECP withhold for
development
contracts and 10 per
cent ECP withhold
for non-development
contracts, and
applying a straight
average ECP percent
to all contracts (5.9
per cent for the
sample database)
Model Method
Underfund
(%)
Overfund
(%)
Underfund
(Dollars)
Overfund
(Dollars)
Portfolio
Total Overall Rank
Equation (1) 9.38 58.90 (178M) 197M 19M 1
NoWithhold 17.40 0 (262M) 0M (262M) 3
Current Practice 9.57 89.30 (169M) 284M 116M 3
Flat Average 11.30 88.70 (175M) 217M 42M 2
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Average Rank
Equation (1) 1 2 3 2 1 1.8
NoWithhold 4 1 4 1 4 2.8
Current Practice 2 4 1 4 3 2.8
Flat Average 3 3 2 3 2 2.6
Note:All dollar amounts rounded to the nearest dollar (BY 16)
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needed. In that context, the OLS model as shown in Table XI represents an almost balanced
approach. Finally, using equation (1) for contracts exceeding $164m in BY 16 dollars would
be model extrapolation, and we caution against such use.
The ﬁeld of changing requirements and their impact at the contract level is full of
opportunity. One major recommendation we provide is to use or add a different source of
data. Adding data from the SARs might provide details on program elements that might
increase the chance of all contracts within that program experiencing an ECP. Another
source of information is EVM reports. Not only could the EVM metric provide a snapshot
of contract health but also research has shown that sentiment analysis of EVM/Status
Reports of programs might provide insightful information and prediction capability
(Freeman, 2013).
Finally, we suggest simultaneous analysis at the contract and the program level. From
our experience, many programs will start a new contract rather than adding requirements
on an existing contract. This practice, while valid and legal, may skew the analysis if
performed solely at the contract level. That is, a program might experience cost growth by
adding new contracts, while existing contracts show no increased cost. Overall, a broader
and more holistic view is needed to accurately assess the impact of changing requirements
for the ﬁnal cost of a DoD program and elements that affect its bottom-line.
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Appendix. Department of defense programs used in the modeling database
 F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet).
 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).
 LVSR (Logistics Vehicle System).
 C-5 (Galaxy).
 MTVR (Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement).
 B-52 CONECT (B-52 Stratofortress Combat Network Communications Technology).
 SH-60/HH-60H/MH-60 (Seahawk).
 AHLTA (Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application).
 V-22 (Osprey).
 F-15 RMP (F-15 Radar Modernization Program (RMP)).
 B-2 (Spirit).
 GCSS-MC (Global Combat Support Systems - Marine Corps).
 BGM-109 (Tomahawk Block IV).
 UH-60L/UH-60M/HH-60M (Black Hawk).
 MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle).
 MIM-104F (PAC-3) Patriot Missile upgrade.
 MIM-104A/B/C/D (Patriot Missile).
 F/A-18A-D (Hornet).
 P-8A (Poseidon).
 H-1 (H-1 Upgrades).
 AGM-84/SLAM E (Harpoon Missile).
 AGM-154C (Joint Standoff Weapon).
 JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition).
 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile).
 AIM-9 (Sidewinder Missile).
 F-35 (Lightning II).
 Essentris (Documentation and electronic medical record system).
 MQ-9 (Reaper, unmanned aerial vehicle).
 GBU-53/B (Small Diameter Bomb II).
 GBU-24 (Paveway III, laser-guided missile).
 AGM-158 (Joint Air-to Surface Standoff Missile).
 LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measure system).
 SLAM ER (Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response, cruise missile).
 F-22 (Raptor).
 GBU-12 (Paveway II).
 AIM-120 (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)).
 CHCS (Composite Health Care System).
 GBU-39 (Small Diameter Bomb).
 DCGS-N (Distributed Common Ground Station-Navy).
 AGM-88 HARM (HARM (High-speed Antiradiation Missile)).
Likelihood and
cost impact
35
 RIM-66 (SM-2 BLK IVA, Missile Program).
 E-3A (Sentry).
 BQM-34 (Firebee, target drone).
 C-40 (Clipper).
 ADM-160 MALD (Miniature Air-Launched Decoy).
 MHS (Military Health System).
 AV-8B (Harrier II).
 F-16 (Fighting Falcon).
 CH-47 (Chinook).
 CH-53E (Sea Stallion).
 Standard Missile Program (Shipborne guided missiles).
 ASIP (Advanced Special Improvement Models, radio
 WCMD (Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser system).
 AGM-65 (Maverick, air-to-ground tactical missile).
 EA-18G (Growler).
 CBU-97 (SFW, Sensor Fuzed Weapon).
 C-130 (Hercules).
 JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle).
 B-2 DMS (B-2 DMS Modernization).
 AEHF (Advanced Extremely High Frequency communication satellites).
 AWS (Affordable Weapon System, cruise missile program).
 ASLS (Aircraft Structural Life Surveillance program).
 MGM-140 (ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile system).
 AH-64 (Apache).
 F-136 Engine.
 E-2D (Advanced Hawkeye).
 GQM-163 (Coyote, supersonic sea skimming target).
 MQ-4C (Triton, unmanned aircraft system).
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